Purpose -To review the alliance partner selection criteria research in order to shed light on how entrepreneurial firms should choose established firms as alliance partners. Design/methodology/approach -Critical differences between entrepreneurial and established firms are presented to emphasize the special risks in alliances between these two types of firms. Extant literature on partner selection criteria is reviewed to show that adequate research adopting the perspective of entrepreneurial firms is lacking. A list of recommendations is developed for entrepreneurial firms in their choice of established firms as alliance partners. Illustrative cases are presented of both successful and unsuccessful cases of strategic alliances between entrepreneurial and established firms. Findings -Provides evidence that entrepreneurial firms have not been adequately recognized in the research on partner selection criteria in strategic alliances. Based on a comprehensive review of the literature, the paper identifies 15 intrinsic and alliancing difference factors between entrepreneurial and established firms. Practical implications -Five key guidelines are developed to assist entrepreneurial firms in selecting established firms as alliance partners. Originality/value -This paper fills a gap in the two literatures on entrepreneurship and strategic alliances regarding research-based guidance available for entrepreneurial firms in the selection of established firms as partners in strategic alliances.
Introduction
Research on strategic alliances has been mostly focused on large companies. This focus is perhaps the result of the ready availability of relevant secondary data, which tend to ignore entrepreneurial and relatively unknown companies engaged in strategic alliances. There is now a rising interest in small and entrepreneurial firms engaging in strategic alliances, many of which are in the biotechnology, semiconductor, and computer industries. However, most researchers do not adequately distinguish between entrepreneurial and large firms, while others observe that strategic alliances between these two types of firms are especially problematic.
Strategic alliances between entrepreneurial and established firms are different from traditional ones (i.e. alliances between large firms) because the partners differ in terms of bargaining power, learning ability, organizational compatibility, attention given to the alliances, and so on. They are also different from alliances in which both partners are small firms. Although alliances between entrepreneurial firms and established firms with compatible resources and strategic objectives have potential to prosper, the sharp inequality in bargaining power often puts such alliances in peril. Also, entrepreneurial firms become less attractive as a partner after established firms absorb the innovations or expertise of their entrepreneurial partners. In such cases, lacking the valuable complementary resources Teng, 2000a, 2003) , entrepreneurial firms are left under-financed, and even become vulnerable to premature acquisition.
How can entrepreneurial firms succeed in strategic alliances with established firms? To better respond to this issue, we first look at how entrepreneurial firms differ from established firms in terms of several factors: resources, innovativeness, status in competition, legitimacy, history/track record, economic/political power, organizational characteristics, business focus, planning horizon, control over technology, confidence in the technology, interorganizational interface, criticality of alliancing, strategic purpose, and consistency of commitment. The literature on partner selection, which is mostly focused on alliances between large established firms, does not adequately reflect these differences between entrepreneurial and established firms. Based on these difference factors, we will propose a set of partner selection criteria suited specifically to entrepreneurial firms when they consider forming alliances with established firms.
Differences between entrepreneurial and established firms
Strategic alliances have been forming at an increasing rate in the last few decades, especially in technology-intensive industries. In particular, alliances between entrepreneurial and established firms have been growing significantly in recent years in the telecommunications, pharmaceutical, internet, electronics, and oil and gas industries. In Table I we have summarized the studies on strategic alliances involving entrepreneurial firms.
Large companies have generally been considered the main source of innovation because of their capability to invest heavily in R&D. However, although large firms consistently have been found to spend more on R&D, small firms have been found to have higher rates of innovation compared to their share of sales or number of employees, especially in the early stages of major new technologies (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Powell and Brantley, 1992; Shefer and Frenkel, 2005) . Specifically, Dougherty and Hardy (1996) found that very few large, mature firms have sustained product innovation because they are not organized to facilitate innovation, and innovators lack the power to connect occasional innovation with organizational resources, processes and strategy. In fact, Larson (1992) defines entrepreneurial as adaptive and innovative, and characterizes entrepreneurial firms as small, successful, and high-growth.
There has been some effort to address the lack of innovativeness in established firms, leading to the emergence of so-called intrapreneurship research in the entrepreneurship field. However, both anecdotal and statistical evidence shows that large corporations have been unsuccessful in creating intrapreneurs or an entrepreneurial climate (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996) and many managers involved in intrapreneurial ventures have had to leave large companies in frustration to start their own ventures.
Entrepreneurship research has long been intertwined with research on small business (e.g. Busenitz et al., 2003) and new technology-based firms (e.g. Hindle and Yencken, 2004) . In general, we do not find explicit definitions of entrepreneurial firms in the published studies that deal with strategic alliances by such firms. These studies Secondary data were collected on 71 startup semiconductor firms between 1980 and 1995 (pp. 308-9) The startups that entered into alliances cited patents more (p. 310). But there is no evidence that the likelihood of a startup learning (measured by the number of patent citation) from an alliance varies with firms' size, while the startup learns less from hiring an inventor or from co-location in a region as it grows (p. 311) Alvarez and Barney (2001) "This article offers some suggestions for managers in entrepreneurial firms to help them appropriate more of the economic value created by their alliances with large firms" (p. 140)
Interviews were conducted on 128 alliances between large and entrepreneurial firms in three industries -biotechnology, IT, and oil-and-gas (p. 139) "In almost 80 percent of these alliances, managers from entrepreneurial firms felt unfairly exploited by their large firm partners" (p. 140).
The research shows that "the ability of large firms to learn about an entrepreneurial firm's new technology faster than an entrepreneurial partner can imitate a large firm's organizational resources puts the entrepreneurial firm at risk" (p. 142) The authors give five alternatives for entrepreneurial firms: going it alone, slowing the large firm's learning rate, using detailed and elaborate contracts to define the alliance relationship, building a relationship of trust, and bringing other resources to the alliance besides a single technology (p. 143) Barley et al. (1992) This is a tentative and descriptive study on the structure of the biotechnology community and its alliances (p. 319) Data were compiled from Bioscan (1988) and other directories on alliances by US-based organizations that contributed to the commercialization of biotechnology through 1987 (p. 319) "A majority of the organizations that form alliances with dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) are large diversified corporations. Many are among the most powerful actors in the pharmaceutical, chemical, food, energy, and agricultural industries" (p. 343). "Strategic alliances in biotechnology generally involve the exchange of knowledge for money. Often the exchange requires a smaller firm to sacrifice some degree of autonomy (for instance, over determining its goals for research and development) to gain access to markets with high barriers to entry. For many biotechnology firms, the compromise may forestall bankruptcy, merger, or acquisition" (pp. 343-4). Only 6 percent of the freestanding dedicated biotechnology firms ceased operating since 1975, which demonstrates an exceptionally low mortality rate that can be attributed to the large number of alliances (p. 324). For diversified corporations, alliancing with small biotechnology provides "access to and leverage over a broad range of research" (p. (p. 45) Learning through strategic alliances has two sources. One is learning the capabilities in certain functional areas, including technological, manufacturing, and marketing; this is content learning. The other is learning the managerial process, including process knowledge related to managing interfirm cooperation and process knowledge that can be applied to a firm's internal activities; this is process learning (p. 56) The number of strategic alliances that provide access to technology, and the number of functional areas that are involved in the alliances positively affect product development for semiconductor startup firms. But the number of strategic alliances that provide access to manufacturing and marketing areas has no impact on product development (pp. 55-6) Deeds and Hill (1996) This study examines the relationship between the number of alliances an entrepreneurial firm engages in and its rate of new product development (p. 42) Secondary data were collected on 132 biotechnology firms in vivo therapeutics and diagnostics (p. 47) There is "an inverted, U-shaped relationship between the number of alliances a firm is engaged in and the rate of new product development" (pp. 52-3) "On average, malperformance problems start becoming serious when firms increase their number of alliances beyond about 25, although diminishing returns set in much earlier" (p. 53) Deeds and Hill (1999) The inverted U-shaped relationship between age and opportunism demonstrates an existence of a honeymoon period in the research alliances, which lasts about 4.6 years, and a liability of adolescence among such alliances (pp. 157-8) (continued) Doz (1988) This chapter deals with issues that are critical to success of technology partnerships between larger and smaller firms, and proposes approaches that can circumvent the pitfalls (p. 319) "Yet, even a cursory observation of such partnerships suggests that many are a disappointment to partners. They do not actually yield the results expected by either or both partners, and even when a measure of success is achieved the tensions in making partnerships work sometimes dwarf their success in the eyes of the participants" (p. 318)
Three sets of issues are critical to success of partnerships between larger and smaller firms: convergence of purpose, consistency of position within the large firm, and interface (pp. 318-9). The issue of convergence of purpose stems from cultural distance, uncertainty and misunderstandings, and hidden agendas (pp. 319-24) , but these problems can be minimized by carefully working out concepts of partnerships at the following levels: technological complementarity, joint business system complementarity and viability, value of outcome versus cost to partners, focus and boundaries, strategic continuity, and precision of agreement (pp. 324-6). The issue of consistency of position within the large firm stems from vested interests and politics of resource commitments (pp. 326-31), and solutions include creating horizontal groups and task forces in the large firms rather than relying on the hierarchy, and communicating regularly and frequently at the top (p. 331). For the issue of interface and boundary spanning, the solutions include organizing joint sessions between members of both firms (p. 332), expanding interface function beyond R&D (p. 334), and setting up coordination committee comprising all the interfaces (p. 336) Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) Preliminary survey data were obtained from 15 large corporations in the USA and six in Japan (p. 452) "Organizations in Japan mix mechanistic and organic design characteristics. In some ways, they are easier for organic entrepreneurial firms in the USA to deal with to the extent that Japanese management takes a more evolutionary and less bureaucratic approach than American Managers (Kagono, Nonaka, Sakakibara and Okumura, 1985) " (p. 451) "Patience is required for successful partnering in high technology because developments may take considerable time to come to fruition" (p. 453) "Giving entrepreneurs considerable autonomy seems to be a key factor in the success of partnerships with large corporations" (p. 453). "The patience Japanese corporations seem to show with their entrepreneurial partners may be in part due to the probability that, in the long run, much of the manufacturing process required to succeed will become a kind of in-house trade secret, especially in electronics and to a lesser extent in bioprocess" (p. Larson (1992) This is an exploratory ethnographic study to understand the processes that cooperative alliances exercise control, especially social control (pp. 78-9)
Interviews were conducted on seven dyadic relationships of four entrepreneurial firms that had experienced rapid growth between 1980 and 1986 (pp. 79, 98 ) This study proposes a three-phase process model of the formation of entrepreneurial dyads: preconditions, conditions to build the exchange structures, and the final phase of integration and control (pp. 97-8)
The relatively stable and sustained relationships "were governed in important ways by social controls arising from norms of trust and reciprocity, and "governance was explained in large part by understanding the subtle control of interdependent and self-regulated players engaged in and committed to mutual gains" (p. 98) Lee et al. (2000) This paper explores whether strategic alliances can help SMEs enter markets that are already well established and dominated by major corporations (p. 44)
Two case studies are used to illustrate the conclusions (p. 49) Strategic alliances can help SMEs overcome resource disadvantage or achieve cost advantage, therefore gain competitive advantages over its bigger rivals (p. 46) "Hence, as a deterrence strategy, credible commitment to stay in the market by the SME through strategic alliance is achieved by the alliance's increased ability to sustain a prolonged intense competition with the bigger firm" (p. 49) SMEs should strategically select partners who possess complementary strengths and expertise, so that the alliance could achieve greater synergistic gains (p. 49) Lu and Beamish (2001) This study explores the impact of various internationalization strategies, including local strategic alliances, used by SMEs on their performance (p. 566) Secondary data were collected on 164 Japanese entrepreneurial firms between 1986 and 1997 (pp. 566, 572 ) "These results demonstrate the importance of alliance partner selection and suggest that local partners provide more value to SMEs than partners from the home country" (p. 578) Miles et al. (1999) This study explores the use of strategic alliances by early-stage technology-based firms (ESTBFs) and factors that might indicate how and when alliances might benefit such firms (p. 21) Survey data were collected on 112 ESTBFs that participated in a provincial funding program in Canada (p. 23) "There was no difference in performance between those firms who were involved in alliances and those firms who were not" (p. 27). "Only when firms used alliances out of choice rather than to manage resource dependencies were alliances associated with firm success" (p. 27) "Those firms who felt that they were dependent on strategic alliances would be left in an inferior bargaining position when it came to negotiating the details of the alliance. As such, these firms would be likely to gain less even if the alliance turned out to be successful" (p. 27). Also, "having a limited choice of partners was associated with poorer performance" (p. 27)
Oliver (2001) This study explores a pattern in the formation of strategic alliances for dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) over time (p. 473)
Secondary data of public citations of biotechnology agreements between 1976 and 1990 (p. 474) New biotechnology firms increase alliance formation during the early years, which is the exploration stage of the organizational learning cycle, and then reduce alliance formation during the exploitation stage (p. 483). The data showed that DBFs steadily formed more new alliances in the first four years, and then the number of new alliances declined until age 11; after that, an inconclusive increase appeared at age 14 (p. 483) (continued) that were independently owned, with more than ten employees, with a product orientation primarily in therapeutics or diagnostics, and were founded in 1987 or earlier (p. 373). Altogether there were 129 NBFs engaging in 765 bilateral agreements (p. 374) In biotechnology industry, "the relevant know-how is broadly dispersed and innovation depends on cooperative interaction among different types of organizations" (pp. 388-9), such as federally funded agencies, pharmaceutical companies, and universities (p. 376) Different types of alliance agreements are strongly complementary rather than substitutable (p. 379), which suggests that "firms are continuing to stay involved in external relationships even as they build up internal capabilities" (p. 389)
As for the determinants for the number of ties, larger (more employees), older, more diversified (both diagnostics and therapeutics), and publicly owned firms have more agreements (p. 380) Preece et al. (1999) This study examines what effects strategic alliances have for early-stage technology-based firms" (ESTBFs, p. 260) international sales and the diversity of global markets (p. 261) Survey data were collected on 75 ESTBFs that participated in a provincial funding program in Canada (p. 267) "An expected finding was the fact that strategic alliances were not a factor in explaining either international intensity or global diversity" (p. 273). The risks of international alliances "may keep firms from using alliances as a means of internationalizing" (p. 273) Shan (1990) and that were funded by venture capitals (pp. 323-4) In uncertain contexts, i.e. when the entrepreneurial firms were young and had raised less amounts of private funding (p. 342), the prominence of their exchange partners -alliance partners, equity investors, and investment banks -enhances their ability to attract resources (p. 344), and they went to initial public offering (IPO) faster and earn greater valuations at IPO (p. 315) Table I .
Firms in search of established partners
generally use "start-ups" and "small start-ups" and "entrepreneurial firms" interchangeably, and use data collected from young and small firms in high tech industries to address entrepreneurial issues (e.g. Deeds and Hill, 1999; Hull, 1988; Shan et al., 1994; Stuart et al., 1999) . In keeping with this tradition in the entrepreneurship field, we define entrepreneurial firms as generally young, small and highly innovative firms in industries with rapidly developing technologies.
Being new and small, entrepreneurial firms are associated with many characteristics that are essentially different from established firms, including limited internal resources and external relations, a lack of legitimacy, and unfamiliarity with new roles and norms created within itself. These disadvantages have contributed to a "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965) . Doz (1988) looked at disappointing partnerships between smaller and larger firms, and identified three sets of critical issues: convergence of purpose, consistency of position within the large firm, and interface. However, small and large firms in a partnership may also differ in other ways. For example, entrepreneurial and established firms are different in terms of resources, economic power, legitimacy, and innovative abilities. The resulting interdependency makes strategic alliances between small and large firms not only desirable but also risky. Moreover, small and large firms are potentially competitors because small, technologically innovative firms challenge the existing products and businesses of established firms. Partnerships between them are especially unstable as they race to learn from each other. Finally, the lack of a track record makes alliances with large established firms especially desirable for entrepreneurial firms in order to gain ready legitimacy in the marketplace.
We identified 15 key difference factors and grouped them into two categories: intrinsic factors and alliance making factors (see Table II ). Intrinsic factors capture the differences between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm when they are examined as single organizations. Interfirm alliancing factors cover the differences between them when they are engaged in strategic alliances with each other. In other words, interfirm factors are relevant only when a partnership between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm exists or is under consideration.
Differences in intrinsic factors
Intrinsic difference factors, just defined, include resources, innovativeness, status in competition, legitimacy, history/track record, power, organizational characteristics, business focus, and planning horizon (see Table II ).
Resources. Entrepreneurial firms typically have limited financial, manufacturing, and marketing resources. Investors are unsure about the prospect of commercialization of the new products, and therefore hesitate to invest large amounts of capital in new companies. Compared to established and large companies, which have multiple sources of cash flow from different lines of businesses to compensate temporarily unprofitable ones, new companies do not have rich internal sources of capital to finance their sole business.
Alliances provide entrepreneurial firms access to the resources they need, especially access to the large firms" financial resources, manufacturing capabilities, and marketing expertise. Shan et al. (1994, p. 390, p. 100 ) report that biotechnology startups, which typically lack financial, marketing and distribution resources, have cooperative relationships primarily with established firms. They also report that alliancing with established firms leads to more innovative outputs, in the form of patents, for startup IJEBR 12,3 firms. Larson's (1992, p . 100) field study of dyadic alliances finds that "limited but dense networks of formal and informal exchange relationships" are the source of growth for "resource-poor entrepreneurial organizations".
Innovativeness. The literature shows consistently that entrepreneurial and small firms have higher rates of innovation. Powell and Brantley (1992) report that in science-based industries, such as computer, semiconductors, and biotechnology, established firms have lagged behind entrepreneurial firms in innovativeness during each industry's early stages. Very often, an innovation or a novel modification of an old product or service is the driver for the establishment of a new company. Indeed, small high technology ventures rely on the commercialization and marketing of innovative products to survive and grow (Poutziouris, 2003, p. 202) . Established firms, in turn, are known to take advantage of the innovativeness of entrepreneurial firms by collaborating with them. For example, Pfizer has alliances with more than 400 companies, over 250 of which are devoted to R&D, and its alliance partners are often (Muson, 2002, p. 21) . Status in competition. Entrepreneurial firms challenge established firms with innovations, making the existing products or services obsolete, attracting new customers, or taking away patrons from the established firms. As firms get older, they become increasingly vulnerable to competition from newcomers in the market. Facing entrepreneurial firms" challenge, established firms could of course take a variety of actions. Some established firms stay put until they are convinced of a real threat from a challenger. Others take proactive actions when potentially threatening ideas or findings are still in their preliminary stages. Strategic alliances are an example of a proactive option that established firms could take to thwart the challenges posed by entrepreneurial firms. For example, in the competitive pharmaceutical industry, where innovation is the major driving force of performance, established firms such as Eli Lilly routinely enter into strategic alliances with smaller biotechnology firms to strengthen their drug development efforts (Futrell et al., 2001) .
Legitimacy. Legitimacy is "a social judgment of acceptance, appropriateness, and desirability" (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 414) . Organizations can derive legitimacy from regulative, normative, cognitive and industrial norms, rules, values, and models (Scott, 1995) . To gain legitimacy, entrepreneurial firms can conform, select, manipulate and create norms and practices, such as registering with the SEC, hiring experienced top managers, locating in the Silicon Valley, emphasizing potential technological breakthrough rather than existing profitability, and cultivating a new consumption mode of internet shopping (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 423) . Singh et al. (1986) found that the propensity of young voluntary social service organizations to dissolve was significantly reduced by activities leading to external legitimacy, such as being listed in the community directory, having a charitable organization registration number, and creating a large board of directors.
History/track record. Being new also means a lack of history and track record for entrepreneurial firms. The short duration of existence of an entrepreneurial firm creates uncertainty about its quality for investors, customers, distributors, and suppliers. In contrast, established firms have a history, and also perhaps a good track record, that enhances their legitimacy and attractiveness. The lack of both legitimacy and track record in small firms can be compensated by forming strategic alliances with established firms that have both these attributes. A study by Goldberg et al. (2003, pp. 183-4) in the Israeli software industry confirms that strategic alliances with important partners, among other efforts such as strengthening internal core competencies, contribute toward a high corporate reputation of small firms.
Economic/political power. Large established companies may dominate the markets and are able to influence the evolution of their environment, both economically and politically. In contrast, small entrepreneurial firms can exercise little influence over their environment. Such a lack of power compels entrepreneurial firms to be highly flexible and responsive to environmental changes.
Organizational characteristics. Entrepreneurial firms and established firms have different organizational characteristics in terms of structure, communication, and decision making. In the early stages of the organizational life cycle, entrepreneurial firms are generally informal, whereas large established firms are bureaucratic and most often fragmented internally. Entrepreneurial firms are agile and nimble in decision making, and alliance-related decisions are made from the top, while established firms have a certain influence over their environment and have, therefore, the luxury of being able to stick to their long-term strategies.
Business focus. Entrepreneurial companies are founded to exploit new business opportunities, usually in relation to manifested or potential needs of customers for certain products or services. In order to survive, a new company needs to create markets, and the consumption of its products and services becomes the focus of their business. In comparison, established firms, especially those that already have a stable hold on their market shares, are eager in their pursuit of growth. In order to keep up with a high rate of expansion, established firms are unsatisfied with just extending the existing product lines. They are more likely to engage in acquiring other businesses, whether related or unrelated, and grow through diversification. Compared to the risk-taking entrepreneurial firms, established firms are cautious about entering into emerging technical subfields, worried about product cannibalization and uncertain investment payoffs.
Planning horizon. Entrepreneurial and established firms may possess different planning horizons. Large established firms usually enjoy the benefits of relative stability and can implement strategies and activities with a long-term planning horizon (Das, 1991 (Das, , 2004a . Entrepreneurial firms, on contrary, are pressed for financial resources and face threats of dissolution all the time. Moreover, large established firms can afford long periods of stagnant or even poor performance by reducing their scale of operations if necessary. Constant dire threats do not allow entrepreneurial firms to easily manage the risks inherent in long-term planning (Das, 2004b (Das, , 2005 Das and Teng, 1997a) . Such differences in the planning horizon between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm have significant impact on their strategy and behavior when they enter into a partnership. For example, speedy development of a product is usually pursued urgently and vigorously by an entrepreneurial firm, while its established partner only wants to get access and keep updated with the new technology and is not usually in a hurry to replace its own mature products. On some occasions, the established firm may intend to use the partnership to control the new technology and new products so that its own existing profitable products will not be replaced too soon.
Differences in alliance-making factors
Alliance making (alliancing) difference factors, when considering a partnership between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm, include control over technology, confidence in the technology, interorganizational interfacing, criticality of alliancing, strategic purpose, and consistency of commitment (see Table II ).
Control over technology. When a new technology is involved in a partnership between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm, which is most often the case, a struggle over the control of technology is more or less present between the partners. The established firm, which is usually the one which is seeking the innovative technology from the entrepreneurial partner, often attempts to capture the technology, transfer it to its own operations, and, ultimately, appropriate it. At the other end of the competition is the entrepreneurial firm, which always tries to retain control over its technology. Such competition for the control over the technology usually results in tensions between the partners, and is a constant challenge for both the established firm and entrepreneurial firm in strategic alliances. This is especially important in the case Firms in search of established partners of technology firms because, as Narula (2004) observes, a small firm's control over its technology and consequently its technology competence can be easily lost if the alliance with a large firm fails. Confidence in technology. The established firm and the entrepreneurial partner may differ at the level of confidence about the technology that is involved in the alliance. Whether a new technology is feasible or a new product is promising is always difficult to precisely predict. Entrepreneurial firms obviously are confident with their technologies, and sometimes overly committed, so that its established partner may well be skeptical. Moreover, it is unwise for the entrepreneurial firm to fully disclose the technology for the sake of convincing the potential partner, because of the risk of leakage of proprietary knowledge. Therefore, an entrepreneurial firm seeking a strategic alliance partner should pay attention to the skepticism of the established firm. A skeptical partner will hesitate to fully commit and, even when committed, will be likely to withdraw the support when satisfactory results are not achieved quickly.
Interorganizational interfacing. The strategic alliance interface refers to the personnel from each side of the partnership that continuously interacts with the other side throughout the alliances. Because of the multiple hierarchical levels in large established firms, the decision to establish a partnership is usually made by the top management but implemented by middle managers and technical specialists. In entrepreneurial firms, in contrast, the decision makers regarding formation of strategic alliances are usually the same as those who manage the alliances. The discontinuities in personnel interfaces while moving from the formation stage to the operational stage in large established firms is complicated by the ambiguity of the simultaneously collaborative and competitive nature of relations in strategic alliances Teng, 1997b, 2000b) , and leads to difficulties for the middle managers in implementation activities. Sometimes even sabotage at the operational level will ruin the partnership that was hastily formed by the top management. The interfacing difficulties are sometimes rooted in conflicting personalities from the partnering companies, especially if the companies are at different stages of the corporate lifecycle. It is reported, for example, that Lotus does not partner with start-ups as a general rule, to avoid the clash of egos (Segil, 1998) .
Criticality of alliancing. Strategic criticality refers to the importance of a partnership to the continued viability of a firm. An entrepreneurial firm, which is restrained by financial, marketing, and manufacturing resources, legitimacy, and track record, would be in some need for a partnership with an established firm. In the case of the biotech industry, small firms are especially dependent on strategic research partnerships with large firms for overcoming their disadvantage of limited resources (Audretsch and Feldman, 2003, p. 285) . While a particular alliance may be a matter of survival for a startup, established firms have the resources to engage in multiple alliances, so that one failed alliance will not lead to the collapse of the whole company. With a larger scale and multiple areas of operation, established firms are more likely to survive a single failed alliance. Such a substantive difference in strategic criticality between an established firm and an entrepreneurial firm in a partnership can easily become a relational source of opportunism if the established firm is not committed to the alliance. Entrepreneurial firms should be vigilant in selecting a reliable and committed partner. Indeed, Narula's (2004) research with small and medium technology firms in electronic hardware industries confirms that these firms IJEBR 12,3 have to be extremely careful about picking alliance partners, given the reality of high rates of R&D alliance failures (Narula, 2004, p. 160) . In contrast, large firms often have redundant, back-up agreements with several firms so that they can easily find alternative avenues for needed resources (Narula, 2004, p. 160) .
Strategic purpose. With almost no exceptions, entrepreneurial firms enter strategic alliances in order to survive and grow. Even if they aim to become an acquisition candidate for the established partner later on, it is still better if they first reach certain maturation and gain sufficient bargaining power. In fact, selling a company after it already has become part of an alliance maybe particularly disadvantageous. A strategic alliance with an entrepreneurial firm (with a promising technology) may sometimes be used by an established firm to prevent it from entering into an alliance with another established firm, especially a rival. Entrepreneurial firms need to be aware of such possibilities and carefully select an established firm that believes in developing its junior partner.
Consistency of commitment. The commitment of member firms in an alliance has been emphasized by both academics and practitioners as critical to the success of partnerships. Large established firms are multiple-unit and complex organizations, and an alliance, while it benefits some people or units, almost inevitably poses threats to other units of the organizations. For example, an alliance with an entrepreneurial firm with superior technologies and product development potentials will be welcomed by the top management and the marketing department, but will pose a threat to the internal research personnel. Therefore, it is important that an entrepreneurial firm be aware of such possibility of inconsistent commitment on the part of an established firm, and select the most reliable partner in terms of its ability to effectively deal with internal changes.
Research on partner selection by entrepreneurial firms
Our examination of the extant literature on partner selection criteria revealed several characteristics, which include a focus on established firms, a focus on international alliances, a dominant framework, certain contextual factors, and some common criteria:
(1) A focus on established firms. Not surprisingly, the literature on alliance partner selection criteria is focused on large and established firms, with very few exceptions (Adler and Hlavacek, 1976; Forrest and Martin, 1992) . (2) A focus on international alliances. The literature is also focused on international alliances, a majority of which are international joint ventures. Since small entrepreneurial firms rarely have the resources, capabilities, or even interest in expanding into international markets, they are understandably left unnoticed by most researchers on partner selection criteria. Moreover, major alliances, involving well-known large firms, are much more likely to be reported in the press (see, e.g. Glaister and Buckley, 1997) . Therefore, large firms are likely to be over-represented in those studies that compiled their data set primarily from press resources. Moreover, small entrepreneurial firms are especially cautious about potential hazards of entering international strategic alliances. A study by Preece et al. (1999, p. 273) found that the risks of international alliances might have kept early-stage technology-based firms "from using alliances as a means of internationalizing". Therefore, it is not surprising that small entrepreneurial firms are seldom included in international strategic alliances studies, and thus Firms in search of established partners also in partner selection criteria research. An exception is Supphellen et al.'s (2002, p. 789 ) survey of Scandinavian small-and medium-sized businesses engaged in international strategic alliances, although they used only personal information sources in evaluating potential partners. (3) A dominant framework. The categorization of task-related and partner-related criteria (Geringer, 1988 (Geringer, , 1991 ) is widely accepted in empirical studies. However, the items under each category vary from study to study, and some task-related items in one study became partner-related in another. For example, reputation, financial resources, and marketing system, are task-related criteria in Geringer (1991) , but partner-related in Glaister (1996) . Adding to the confusion, "distribution channels" is a task-related criterion (Glaister, 1996, p. 17) while "established marketing and distribution system" is partner-related (p. 21) in the same study. (4) Contextual factors. Some researchers have considered contextual factors in determining the importance of individual selection criteria in different situations. In one of the early studies, Tomlinson (1970) found that parent firms of different size (larger and smaller), in different industries (e.g. oil, electricals, vehicles, tobacco/food), and with different reasons for entering into a joint venture, use different partner selection criteria. Other contextual factors studied include Geringer's (1988) "perceived task environment uncertainty" and "diversity of line functions, Bailey et al.'s (1998) form of agreement, objectives of the project, type of collaborator, and the characteristics of the selecting company, and Al-Khalifa and Peterson's (1999) size and experience of the company and the education and experience of the CEO. Both Glaister (1996) and Luo (1998) found significant influence of alliance motives on the selection criteria. However, Glaister and Buckley's (1997) study, based on a sample slightly different from Glaister (1996) , found that the purpose of the venture, as well as partner nationality, industry of the joint venture, and the relative partner size, do not influence the relative importance of different selection criteria. (5) Common criteria. The following is a list of the common criteria that have been deemed as important in the alliance partner selection criteria literature:
. Task-related criteria: complementary products or skills; financial resources; technology capabilities or uniqueness; location; marketing or distribution systems, or established customer base; reputation and image; managerial capabilities; government relationship, including regulatory requirements and government sales; help in faster entry into the target market; and industry attractiveness.
. Partner-related criteria: strategic fit or interdependence, or compatible goals; compatible or cooperative culture and ethics; prior ties and successful prior association; trust between top managers; strong commitment; similar status, including size and structure; reciprocal relationship; commensurate risk; and ease of communication.
Analysis of partner selection criteria
The topic of partner selection criteria covers almost every aspect of a firm, from financing, marketing, manufacturing, technology, and product, to goals, commitment, size, culture, management, and past ties with partners. In Table III Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) 3. Culture (a) Similar/compatible national or corporate culture Bailey et al. (1998) (b) Knowledge of local culture Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) (c) Knowledge of western culture Kumar (1995) Bailey et al. (1998 ), Dacin et al. (1997 , Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hitt et al. (2000) , Luo (1998 ), Tatoglu (2000 , Tomlinson (1970) , Wang et al. (1999) (b) Difference in liquidity Gulati (1995) (c) Public funding Shan, Walker and Kogut (1994) Powell and Brantley (1992) 5. Goals (a) Compatible/complementary goals, needs, philosophy, attitudes, or strategic intentions Lasserre (1984) Forrest and Martin (1992) Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), Bailey et al.(1998) , Brouthers et al. (1995) , Hakanson and Lorange (1991) , Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) , Luo (1998) , Wang et al. (1999) (b) Strategic interdependence Gulati (1995) 6. Government (a) Compliance with government requirements, pressure, support or subsidies, etc.
Geringer (1988, 1991) (b) Ability to negotiate with local government Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) (c) Sales to government Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 Dacin et al. (1997) (b) Industrial experience Kumar (1995) , Luo (1997 Luo ( , 1998 (c) Relatedness of businesses, relevant experience Li and Rowley (2002) Glaister (1996), Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) (d) Position within the industry Arino et al. (1997) , Bailey et al. (1998) 8. Internationalization (a) Export opportunities Geringer (1988) (b) Local/national identity Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 (c) Foreign experience Kumar (1995) , Luo (1997) , Shan (1990) (d) International experience Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) (e) Connection in local community Kumar (1995) 9. Learning (a) Absorptive capacity or learning ability Luo (1997 Luo ( , 1998 (b) Ability to acquire skills Dacin, Hitt and Levitas (1997) (c) Long-term learning opportunities Larson (1992) 10. Location (a) Favorable location Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 (b) Geographical closeness Geringer (1988) 11. Management 
Tyler and Steensma (1995) (e) Less mechanistic and more organic in organizational structure
(f) Patient management giving more autonomy
(g) Trust between the top management teams Forrest and Martin (1992) Larson (1992) Glaister (1996), Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) , Tatoglu (2002), Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) 12. Manufacturing (a) Manufacturing facilities, resources, and personnel Geringer (1988) , Kumar (1995) , Tomlinson (1970) , Wang, Wee and Koh (1999) (b) Knowledge of production processes Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) (c) Access to raw materials or components Geringer (1988) , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) , Wang, Wee and Koh (1999) 13. Market (a) Marketing, distribution, and service facilities and competence Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) , Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Kumar (1995) , Luo (1998) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) , Wang et al. (1999) (b) Market share, market power Kumar (1995) , Luo (1997 Luo ( , 1998 , Tomlinson (1970) (c) Narrower market domain
Baum, Calabrese
and Silverman (2000) (d) Faster entry into the target market Dacin et al. (1997) (e) Knowledge of local market Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), Arino et al. (1997 ), Geringer (1988 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hitt et al. (2000) , Tatoglu (2000) 14. Past ties (a) Satisfactory prior association/ties/transactions Chung et al. (2000) , Gulati (1995) , Li and Rowley (2002) , Podolny
Larson (1992) Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), Bailey et al. (1998 ), Geringer (1988 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hitt et al. (2000) , Kumar (1995) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) , Tyler and Steensma (1995) , Wang et al. (1999) (b) Avoid too many ties Gulati (1995) (c) Common third-party and indirect ties Gulati (1995) (d) Time elapsed since last tie Gulati (1995) (continued) (2002) 15. Product (a) Full line of products Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 (b) Access to product Geringer (1988) , Tatoglu (2000) (c) Product quality Dacin et al. (1997) (d) Product relatedness Luo (1997) (e) Diversification in products Powell and Brantley (1992) (f) Diversification in products (not a criterion) Shan (1990) 16. Reciprocity (a) Reciprocal exchanges of alliance opportunities, mutual benefits
Larson ( ( ), Geringer (1988 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hitt et al. (2000) , Luo (1998 ), Tatoglu (2000 (b) Personal reputation Larson (1992) (c) Age (older) Powell and Brantley (1992) 18. Risk (a) Risk reduction Tyler and Steensma (1995) (b) Level of asset-specific investments required Tyler and Steensma (1995) (c) Commensurate risk Brouthers et al. (1995) (d) Information availability relative to partner Tyler and Steensma (1995) 19. Size (a) Similar size/status or corporate structure
Geringer (1988), Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Luo (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) (b) Prominent status
(continued) 
Harrigan (1988) (d) Different size Gulati (1995) (e) Larger (more employees) Powell and Brantley (1992) (f) Smaller (less employees) Shan (1990) 20. Technology (a) Technical competence/uniqueness Forrest and Martin (1992) Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), Bailey et al. (1998 ), Dacin et al. (1997 , Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Hitt et al. (2000) , Hakanson and Lorange (1991) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) (b) Life cycle phase of the technology Tyler and Steensma (1995) (c) Strategic importance of the technology Tyler and Steensma (1995) (d) Licenses, patents, know-how, etc.
Geringer (1988, 1991 (e) Development speed Bailey et al. (1998) (f) Experience in technology application Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Tatoglu (2000) (g) Highly innovative
Baum et al.
(h) Innovative output (not a criterion)
(i) Imitative or innovative technology Shan (1990) , Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) (j) Invest sufficiently in process technology and manufacturing capability
Hull et al. Firms in search of established partners criteria studied into 21 categories: (in alphabetical order) Commitment, Cost, Culture, Finance, Goals, Government, Industry, Internationalization, Learning, Location, Management, Manufacturing, Market, Past ties, Product, Reciprocity, Reputation, Risk, Size, Technology, and "Other" (a multi-area criterion that refers to complementary capabilities, resources, and strengths in cooperative activities). The studies on partner selection criteria are placed in different columns in Table III according to the nature of the alliance samples S namely, large-large alliances, large-small alliances, small-small alliances, and small-large alliances S with the first term in the pair denoting the focal firm and the second its partner. Most of the studies fall in the last column labeled "mixed and unspecified size," which include studies that do not specify the size of the partners in the alliances studied, or only specify the size of one party in an alliance while ignoring the relative size of its partners. For example, Geringer (1988 Geringer ( , 1991 , Glaister (1996) , Glaister and Buckley (1997) , Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) , and Kumar (1995) do not specify the size of any of the partners in the alliances. Beamish (1987) , Dacin et al. (1997) , Hakanson and Lorange (1991) , Hitt et al.(2000) , Tatoglu (2000) , Tomlinson (1970) , and Tyler and Steensma (1995) specify that the selecting party (focal firm) is a large firm, and the selected partners are either unspecified in size or specified as mixtures of large and small firms. Arino et al. (1997) and Wang et al. (1999) include both small and large firms as the selectors but do not specify the relative size of their partners. Bailey et al. (1998) and Brouthers et al. (1995) specify that they have small and large firms both as selectors and selected firms. Luo (1997 Luo ( , 1998 specifies that the selected partners are all large firms but does not specify the size of the selectors. Supphellen et al. (2002) specify that the selectors are small-and medium-sized companies but are silent on the status of their partners.
As Table III shows, very few studies (only six of them) have small-large alliances as their research subjects. Only one of them (Forrest and Martin, 1992) investigates the selection criteria small firms used to select their larger partner. The conclusions of three other studies may suggest some of the attributes of large firms that the small firms might be looking for (see Doz, 1988; Hull et al., 1988; Stuart et al., 1999) . Our examination of the studies on strategic alliances of entrepreneurial or small firms reveals that most of the studies do not look at partner selection criteria used by the entrepreneurial firms or their partners (see Table I ). However, the results of many of the studies provide important information on what partner selection criteria could be. Forrest and Martin (1992) investigated the alliance experiences and factors that make technology related alliances between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical and chemical firms successful. Their study found that large pharmaceutical and chemical firms chose entrepreneurial firms based on technical and managerial capabilities, trust, compatibility, shared philosophies and attitudes, ties of the entrepreneurial firm with potential competitors, and commitment. Although not much information is given concerning the partner selection criteria used by the small firms, the authors implied that the small firms look at the financial resources of the large firm. An intangible factor, having to do with the gut feelings of the partners ("essential chemistry"), was found by Forrest and Martin (1992) to be important for both small and large partners.
Although Forrest and Martin (1992) reported a higher success rate for dedicated biotechnology alliance firms in alliances than their larger partners (83 percent versus 47.5 percent), it has also been found that startup biotechnology firms that initially IJEBR 12,3 132 allied with established potential rivals performed worse on average (Baum et al., 2000) . In contrast, Harrigan (1988) found that size did not predict the success of strategic alliances, that is, alliances between partners of similar size are not more successful, in terms of venture survival, duration, or subjective assessments of success by the partners, than those between dissimilar partners. In addition, similarity in status, such as size, has been emphasized in many studies (e.g. Chung et al., 2000; Daniels, 1971; Geringer, 1991; Li and Rowley, 2002; Podolny, 1994) on partner selection criteria for established firms as an important and effective criterion. Thus, there is no consistency in the results concerning the dissimilarity of size that always exists in alliances between entrepreneurial firms and established firms. Larson's (1992) case studies of four entrepreneurial firms engaged in seven cooperative alliances proposed several criteria that should be considered for entrepreneurial firms in the selection of partners: personal reputations and prior relations, including histories, individual friendships, capabilities, commitment, and mutual benefits; firm's reputation, including long-term learning opportunities of expertise and innovative capabilities of key suppliers and customers, ease of communication and working relationships, enhancement of reputation, and potential impact on growth; mutual economic advantage; and trust developed in the trial period (Larson, 1992, pp. 84-8) . Some of these criteria have received empirical support in other studies. For example, Hu and Korneliussen (1997, p. 168) found that personal ties have a positive effect on the performance of small firms in strategic alliances. BarNir and Smith (2002, p. 228 ) also found that personal ties of managers in small businesses lead to more interfirm alliances. The importance of ease of communication has been confirmed by Deeds and Hill (1999) in an investigation on the effectiveness of opportunism deterrence in dedicated biotechnology firms. They found that strong relationships between the partners, such as congruent backgrounds and frequent communication, serve as a much more effective deterrent to opportunistic actions than alliance-specific investments or contingent claims contracts, suggesting that these should be used as selection criteria by entrepreneurial firms.
The exploration of the determinants of involvement in strategic alliances for entrepreneurial firms represents another research avenue. Kelley et al. (2001) found that technology-based and product-based knowledge are both positively related to the number of alliances formed. Powell and Brantley (1992) found that relatively larger, older, more diversified, and publicly-owned entrepreneurial firms have more agreements, suggesting that the partners of entrepreneurial firms used size, age, product diversification, and public funding as the selection criteria. However, Shan et al. (1994) found that larger startup biotechnology firms, with more existing innovation output, did not attract more large firms into cooperative relationships. Only public funding was related to alliance formation, suggesting that perhaps neither innovative output nor size were used by established firms in choosing startup firms as partners. In fact, Shan's (1990) study of a similar sample found that those new biotechnology firms that were smaller and used imitative rather than innovative technology entered into more cooperative agreements. Chen and Li (1999) found that the number of strategic alliances that provide access to technology, not to manufacturing and marketing areas, has a positive impact on product development for US semiconductor startup firms. This result suggests that entrepreneurial firms should choose partners that can provide access Firms in search of established partners to technology, not necessarily manufacturing or marketing, if they are focused on new product development. However, an exclusive focus on new product development may not be enough for the long-term survival and growth of entrepreneurial firms. An emphasis on access to process and manufacturing learning is often needed for an entrepreneurial firm to grow out of the technology-only stage, so that alliance partners with potential contributions to manufacturing and marketing should be preferable. It is apparent that some of contextual factors that have been identified in the partner selection criteria literature, such as motivation of the partnership and partner's size and other characteristics, distinguish strategic alliances between entrepreneurial and established firms from those between established firms only. For both entrepreneurial firms and established firms, the differences of size, status, and other characteristics should provide sufficient justification for extra caution when considering the formation of strategic alliances, starting from the selection of the partner.
Guidelines for partner selection by entrepreneurial firms Studies have generally proposed or found empirically that partner selection criteria are influenced by the motivations for entering into alliances as well as the characteristics of the firms, such as size, organizational type, industry, and organizational culture. When an entrepreneurial firm teams up with an established firm or even another entrepreneurial firm, it is likely that the partners in both scenarios differ in size, motivation, and organizational culture. Entrepreneurial firms and established firms are quite different from each other (see Table II ). Such differences usually result in conflicts between them. As our earlier discussion shows, entrepreneurial firms should not follow the conventional partner selection criteria without a great degree of caution.
When alliancing with an established firm, the entrepreneurial firm should keep in mind that the partner is different from itself in structure, communication, decision making, and so on, and be aware of possible conflicts or risks that may arise from these differences. We propose the following list of partner selection criteria that an entrepreneurial firm should adopt when it considers forming strategic alliances with established firms.
Compatible motivations
Sometimes established firms form strategic alliances with entrepreneurial firms that possess promising technology just to preempt possible partnerships between the entrepreneurial firms with their competitors, or to forestall the potential threats to their own mature products posed by the new technology. Such self-interested motivations would not of course be overtly a part of the negotiations. The entrepreneurial firms have to pay attention to other cues of whether or not the established firms' real motivations to form strategic alliances with them are to develop new products, so that there would be compatible objectives for survival and growth. The existence of a few major competitors (of the established firm) that are also actively seeking to develop new products using the same new technology through interfirm alliances is usually a sign that a blocking strategy is being attempted. Such signs are even stronger when the entrepreneurial firm is leading the technological development. A lack of a detailed action schedule for the alliance is another cue that the established firm is not really interested in developing the technology but in diverting the immediate threats.
An example is the alliance between Telefonica S.A. and Bidland Systems. Because the valuable resources of technology startups are often intangible knowledge or information, learning races can actually finish even before the alliances enter into the operation stage. Established firms' possible motivations are especially important for entrepreneurial firms. The hidden motivation of Telefonica made it almost impossible for Bidland Systems, a San Diego-based startup, to survive at all (Peterson, 2001) . Bidland Systems was a leading provider of easy and affordable online auction solutions (Business Wire, 2000) . It was enticed into strategic alliance talks with Telefonica S.A., the Spanish telecommunication giant, and its American subsidiary, Telefonica B2B, which reached a joint venture and investment agreement with Bidland in August 2000 (Business Wire, 2000) . However, several months later, Telefonica refused to abide by the agreement. Bidland then filed a lawsuit contending that Telefonica launched its own venture after having "obtained complete access to Bidland's proprietary business-to-business auction and dynamic e-commerce business information and technology" (Business Wire, 2000) . Telefonica apparently had an opportunistic motivation towards Bidland's attractive technology, which was at the same time relatively easy to appropriate.
Access to manufacturing and marketing functions Long-term survival and growth objectives necessitate entrepreneurial firms to obtain manufacturing and marketing facilities to exploit their innovative capabilities in technology. That would improve their chances for transforming themselves from a fragile organization into a stable one. However, one of the weaknesses of technology-based entrepreneurial firms is the lack of attention paid to marketing strategies (Jones-Evans and Westhead, 1996) , and the literature on marketing and technology-based entrepreneurship has not done a good job in explaining how technology-based entrepreneurs take on marketing their innovations successfully (Boussouara and Deakins, 1999, p. 207) . We propose that forming strategic alliances with established firms can be one avenue for entrepreneurial firms to learn about markets and build up marketing resources and experience. Hence, entrepreneurial firms should choose established firms that are willing to offer access to manufacturing and marketing resources.
As an illustration, consider the successful partnership between Glaxo Holdings PLC and ICOS Corp. This alliance marked a major transition in alliance making between entrepreneurial biotechnology firms and established pharmaceutical firms during the early 1990s, a transition from "mere money-for-ideas or money-for-products swaps" (Axinn, 1992, p. SR10) to marketing agreements in which the entrepreneurial firms are more involved. Based on the complementary strengths of ICOS's molecular biology expertise and Glaxo's drug discovery expertise, a shared R&D and co-promotion agreement was signed in 1991 (Biotech Patent News, 1991) for developing therapeutic agents for cardiovascular disease and asthma . Two years after the compounds they jointly developed entered Phase 1 testing (PR Newswire, 1995) , ICOS gained all commercial rights to the compounds, and was well-positioned for further research and commercialization independently (Worldwide Biotech, 1997) . In alliances that go beyond mere technology or product transfer, startups like ICOS can learn from their partners' technology expertise and get involved in interacting with consumers, thereby strengthening their capability to survive and grow by themselves.
Firms in search of established partners
Involvement and commitment of middle managers Although alliance deals are made between the top managers of both partnering firms, the middle managers in established firms are the ones who usually carry out the operations. In order to avoid alienation or even sabotage by the middle managers, who sometimes do not understand the opportunities of alliances but rather feel threatened by outsiders, the entrepreneurial firms need to emphasize the importance of involving middle managers from the very beginning. Whether the middle managers from the established firms are involved and committed to the alliance should be one of the important criteria that entrepreneurial firms should use in selecting partners. Consider the case of the partnership between Alza and Ciba-Geigy, now terminated. This research alliance between Alza Corp., a California-based entrepreneurial company which has been a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson since 2001, and Ciba-Geigy of Switzerland, which is now part of Novartis AG after it merged with Sandoz Inc. in 1996, showcases the clash of organizational cultures between an entrepreneurial company and an established pharmaceutical giant and the resulting resentment of the middle managers (Doz, 1996, pp. 65-6) . The real reason for the dissolution, however, as revealed in Doz's (1996) interview with executives from both companies, is the fact that Alza personnel were deeply frustrated by the bureaucratic structures and lengthy and formal procedures in Ciba-Geigy. When inter-firm cooperation was needed between top managers or lab scientists, it was seldom possible without middle managers being involved. The lack of involvement by middle managers in Ciba-Geigy apparently thwarted the interaction attempts of Alza's personnel, despite the enthusiasm of the top management. The separation of middle managers from the top management in large established firms makes it crucial to involve middle managers in the negotiation stage and, thereafter, the operation of alliances. Whether the established firm can take measures to make its middle managers accessible for its entrepreneurial partner should be a vital criterion that a startup firm should emphasize in selecting its alliance partner.
Dedicated task forces
In addition to committed middle managers, the prospect that a task force dedicated to the coordination of the alliance partners will be set up should also receive emphasis. The reason is that even if the middle managers are committed, the slow, multi-level communication within the established firms is very often the source of frustrations and conflicts. The importance of a dedicated alliance task force has already been demonstrated by the fact that many companies have set up separate departments that deal with strategic alliances. When such a department is not set up, at least a dedicated task force should be envisioned by the established firm. The entrepreneurial firm, therefore, should keep this in mind as a selection criterion.
A good example here is the success of the partnership between, again, Alza Corp (now a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson) and Theratechnologies Inc. (a Canadian biopharmaceutical company) since 2001. This success can be attributed to Alza's dedicated task force comprised of personnel across the various stages of the cooperation, and the additional support of the alliance management department, according to Theratechnologies' Chief Scientific Officer, Dr Abribat (Delivery Times: An Alza Publication, 2003). These dedicated task forces have enabled Alza to tailor their approach to each partner and respond quickly to their needs. Only three months after their first meeting in a conference, the two companies reached a cooperative agreement with a clearly defined strategy, detailed R&D activities, and time frames. Now three development projects between the two companies are progressing "extremely well." Although a separate department for alliance management is not always necessary, at least a project-level task force should be put together. The ability of an established firm to devote a task force for a partner should be one of the top criteria that an entrepreneurial firm should consider when selecting alliance partners.
Intention to act with speed
The difference in the criticality of an alliance between two partners may result in conflicts when the entrepreneurial firm is eager to make the alliance work while the established firm wants to take some time. Therefore, the entrepreneurial firms should make sure that the potential partner is just as keen to act with speed as they are to make the alliance work. Such intentions can be best manifested in detailed action plans and specific schedules. A lack of intention to act with speed can be traced to mere enthusiasm without genuine action plans.
Consider the case of the successful partnership between Roche Holdings Ltd, a giant Swiss pharmaceutical company, and Trimeris Inc., a North Carolina-based biotech rising star, in developing anti-HIV drugs (Seachrist, 1999 ). Trimeris's vice president, Michael Rechny, was convinced by Roche's corporate profile as a leader in drug development, and believed that Roche was as anxious as Trimeris about "a timely introduction of a whole new class of anti-retroviral agents," and would help them speed up the timely development of the two promising anti-HIV fusion inhibitors, T-20 and T-1249 (Seachrist, 1999) . Within two years of the formation of the partnership in 1999, the two products were successfully developed and were granted fast-track status by the FDA, and the two companies extended their partnership for at least three more years (Coghill, 2001) . The intention to act with speed, which was a major attraction for Trimeris, is a big concern for entrepreneurial firms, because their investors usually demand immediate success in technology advancement and product development. Failure to have quick results often is a matter of survival for startup firms. This case shows how significant the intention to act with speed on the established firm's part is in an alliance with entrepreneurial startups.
Concluding remarks
Entrepreneurial firms have increasingly entered into strategic alliances, especially in technology-based industries. They seek developmental resources from established partners. However, the asymmetries in power, motives, and learning ability between entrepreneurial firms and their established partners make it imperative that careful attention is given to the selection of alliance partners. We have noted how entrepreneurial firms are different from established firms in terms of intrinsic and alliance making factors, including resources, innovativeness, status in competition, legitimacy, history/track record, economic/political power, organizational characteristics, business focus, planning horizon, control over technology, confidence in the technology, interorganizational interfacing, criticality of alliancing, strategic purpose, and consistency in commitment. Such differences should result in different approaches for entrepreneurial firms in strategic alliance management than those between established firms, which are the major subject of strategic alliance research. Our focus in this paper was on partner selection criteria, the first concern in strategic Firms in search of established partners alliance management. We found that very few partner selection criteria studies have been done with particular reference to entrepreneurial firms. For empirical testing of whether the guidelines proposed here lead to more effective performance of entrepreneurial firms engaging in strategic alliances with established firms, care should be taken in measuring success in appropriate terms. For instance, alliance terminations should not be automatically considered as failures -as some researchers have done -because many alliances are agreements that are essentially temporary in nature (Das and Teng, 2000b) . Similarly, an acquisition of an entrepreneurial firm by its established partner, or a third party, may or may not be an indicator of alliance failure, depending on the entrepreneur's expectations. Contextual factors, such as industry, stage of technology development, size of the alliance partner, location of the firms, and motives of the alliances, may also need to be considered. Future researchers need to examine if there are moderating factors that influence the relative importance of the guidelines we have proposed here. Another significant research question is how entrepreneurial firms can better exploit the resources in established firms once the alliances are set up.
Based on our analysis of how entrepreneurial firms differ from established firms along a number of dimensions, we framed several recommendations urging entrepreneurial firms to take note of certain characteristics of established firms in selecting them as alliance partners. Entrepreneurial firms should choose those established firms that are motivated to develop technology or product rather than simply to meet the threat of a new technology, that are willing to provide access to manufacturing and marketing functions, that involve committed middle managers in addition to enthusiastic top managers, that will set up dedicated task forces dealing with the alliances, and that are committed to act immediately and with speed. We believe that by being especially attentive to these factors in selecting established firms as partners, entrepreneurial firms would have better prospects for survival and growth.
